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ECLIPSED BY RUSSIA: TRUMP’S FIRST 100 DAYS
Maxine David
Institute for History, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands
Barely a day passed in Donald Trump’s first 100 days without Russia dominating the headlines.
While campaigning, Trump expressed admiration for President Putin, promising he would
succeed in befriending the Kremlin where Barack Obama had failed. This promise now looks
set to define Trump’s presidency. The extensive network linking his associates and adminis-
tration to Russia has created a different kind of swamp than the one he pledged to cleaning
up in Washington. This intervention considers what this means for Trump’s foreign and
security policy and for those external actors for which Russia is a key actor. For Syria and
Ukraine respectively, there is little hope the United States is able and willing to play a pivotal
role in ending their conflicts. Trump’s campaign rhetoric gave European allies reason to doubt
Obama’s commitment to defend themagainst a possible Russian threatwould bematched by
Trump; the first 100 days gave no cause to rethink that. While many ‘America First’ promises
are being kept, any predictability is heavily undermined by a sense Trump does not under-
stand what the USA’s interests are, nor how foreign relations can rebound on those at home.
The Russia controversy has damaged the US reputation, weakening it on the world stage, a
worrying development for those who have so far cleaved to the US-led liberal world order. In
reflecting on Trump’s first 100 days and Russia, it is worth scrutinising his key foreign and
security appointments and effects on the US reputation.
Two key appointments did nothing to allay fears about the Trumpadministration’s relation-
ship with the Kremlin. Indeed, whether disregarding or not understanding how perceptions
matter, Trump’s appointment of Rex Tillerson, former Chief Executive of Exxon-Mobil, to the
position of Secretary of State and Michael Flynn as National Security Advisor seemed calcu-
lated to increase not dim speculation. Even the appointment of Jeff Sessions as Attorney
General (controversial for other reasons) would not prove immune from the Russia effect as it
emerged he had failed to disclose during his confirmation hearing his two prior conversations
with the Russian Ambassador to Washington. The controversy was further fuelled by the
exposure of a long trail linking Trump, his family, advisors and associates to Russia. From those
such as Paul Manafort, Trump’s one time campaign manager connected to Russian and
Ukrainian oligarchs and Ukraine’s ousted former President, Yanukovych, to Felix Sater, a
business associate with alleged ties to the Russian mafia, the connections are extensive.1
Consequently, all Trump’s efforts to dismiss accusations of colluding with the enemy have
failed. On 30 March 2017, the Senate Intelligence Committee commenced what its Chairman
called a ‘rare activity’, an open hearing into the part played by Russian ‘active measures past
and present’, as well as a review of Russian actions in the 2016 election campaign (Reuters
2017).
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Both at home and abroad, this is significant. Domestically, Trump’s Russia connections
have distracted and diverted resources from the business of government to one of inves-
tigation. Reportedly, eight organs of government are involved in scrutiny of the President
and his associates (Campbell 2017). The House and Senate Intelligence Committees are
leading investigations into the links between Trump’s White House and Russia, as is the FBI.
Those investigations are themselves not uncontroversial because of accusations of partisan-
ship on the part of key players, including Attorney General Sessions and the one-time
Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Devin Nunes. The investigations are not
simply about who had conversations with whom and when, they include investigations into
Manafort’s financial activities (Schmidt et al. 2017), as well as whether Flynn received illegal
payments from Russia (Wright 2017). Between that and the compromised election itself, US
democracy is not looking healthy; witness the hacking of Democrats’ emails, the FBI’s
unfortunate timing in announcing a further investigation of Hillary Clinton’s emails and,
to outsiders, the peculiarity of a candidate winning the majority of the popular vote losing
the presidency itself.
The health of US democracymatters for foreign policy because it speaks directly towhether
theUnited States can exert soft power abroad. UnderminingUS hegemony has long been one
of Putin’s goals; failings in US democracy and Trump’s own failure to protect the US reputation
play into Putin’s hand. The dense links between Trump’s circle and Russia contrasts starklywith
the wider Washington perspective which views Russia through the lens of a threat, even
enemy, to theAmericanwayof life and the liberal world order. Take, for example, the transcript
of the confirmation hearing for General James Mattis as Secretary of Defense. Under ques-
tioning about his perceptionof international relations today,Mattis responded theworld order
was ‘under the biggest attack since World War II’, from Russia, terrorists and China (Senate
Committee on Armed Services 2017, 41). In that hearing, chaired, it should be acknowledged
by John McCain (whose anti-Russian credentials are well-established) Russia was mentioned
45 times, Putin 15. This compared to ISIS/ISIL with 17 references, terrorism 9, China 21 and Xi
Jinping none. Under his own confirmation questioning, Tillerson spoke of the need to be ‘clear
eyed about our relationship with Russia’, referring to its invasion of Ukraine, its support of
‘Syrian forces that brutally violates the laws ofwar’ and the fears of NATO allies (Senate Foreign
Relations Committee 2017, 21). His responses then, especially about sanctions against Russia,
contrastedwith what he had said as a businessman, such that Tillerson the diplomat has so far
given less cause for concern than Trump, whose own perception of Russia does not accord
with the dominant view on Capitol Hill.
Just one moment cast doubt on Trump’s pro-Russian inclinations: his authorisation to
launch Tomahawk missiles against a military airbase in Homs province, Syria, on 7 April 2017.
The strike signalled that Trump’s administration was not Obama’s and that the White House
would not let Russia (and Iran) continue to have things entirely their way. The use of no fewer
than 59 missiles was also consistent with Trump’s America First Foreign Policy that ‘our
military dominance must be unquestioned’ (White House, The 2017). Making clear this was
a response to reports of Assad’s regime using chemical weapons, and forewarning Russia,
which itself had military personnel and aircraft at this base, was sensible in avoiding a further
escalation of US–Russia tensions. It drew only predictable Russian responses that this served to
cause a further deterioration in relations (President of Russia 2017) and the temporary
suspension of the Memorandum of Understanding on Prevention of Flight Safety Incidents,
an information sharing agreement, reportedly restored later (Mills 2017). Overall, the strike
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was received well in Washington and beyond, with many hoping the administration would
now commit sufficient time and attention to work with others to end the conflict (Palazzo and
Foster 2017). That cautious optimism has so far not been rewarded. While the strike was
sensibly not followed by any move that could be interpreted as a desire for regime change in
Syria, something to which Russia would have objected (and perhaps acted) more strenuously,
neither was it accompanied by action targeted at human rights protection; fresh activity to
revive the Humanitarian Access Task Force, for example, or renewed vigour in US activity in
the UN. It was difficult to escape the impression this was deliberately staged to undermine
those arguing at home that Trump was in Putin’s pocket. That some distraction would be
desirable is hardly arguable, as events around Flynn testify.
Famously now, Michael Flynn lasted a mere 23 days before being forced out of office
under weight of evidence he had discussed the possible lifting of sanctions against
Russia with the Russian Ambassador to Washington during the campaign period and
then lied to Vice-President Pence about that. This might not have touched Trump
himself had it not quickly emerged that even before Flynn took office, Trump and his
advisors had been advised by the former acting US Attorney General Sally Yates that
Flynn was being investigated. On Trump’s 99th day in office, his former National Security
Advisor was issued with a subpoena to release to the Senate Intelligence Committee
documents relating to his communications with Russia.
Perceptions matter in foreign policy (Wang 2006), especially for the world hegemon,
whose reputation and image are important. Flynn and Tillerson were not the sole or,
especially in the case of Tillerson, the most obvious choices for appointment to their
offices. What conclusions can be drawn from Trump’s insistence on doing so? There are
various possibilities – inexperience, naivety, arrogance, disregard for opinion, self-interest;
none speaks well in foreign and security policy terms. Their links to Russia may not have
figured as positive considerations for Trump in appointing them but, clearly, neither were
they hindrances. When speaking of reputation, one might imagine a braid in which the
other strands are legitimacy, trust and power. Remove reputation and the others unravel
too. At a time when the liberal ideas and norms so long the backbone of international
relations are threatened by those of non-western, often illiberal actors, what Trump is
doing to the US reputation matters.
Trust is an essential component for durable alliance. Trump’s failure to distance himself
from Russia or to show support for Ukraine’s integrity will continue to test the USA’s
relationship with other NATO states far beyond 100 days. The strike against Syria did
nothing to reassure key allies nor to divert Russia from its path there – or elsewhere. Events
since April 29 force one to conclude that Trump’s administration will look back to those
first 100 days as halcyon compared to what will follow.
Note
1. See Crowley (2017) for a visual representation of the connections, both proven and unproven.
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